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Universal Health Coverage in Francophone Sub-Saharan
Africa: Assessment of Global Health Experts' Confidence in
Policy Options
Elisabeth Paul,a,b Fabienne Fecher,a RemoMeloni,c Wim van Lerberghed
Even within the fairly homogenous context of francophone Africa, among 18 options presented to experts on
how to proceed toward universal health coverage (UHC), consensus was reached on only 1 with respect to
effectiveness and another with respect to feasibility. The complexity and challenges of UHC as well as the weak
evidence base likely contribute to this uncertainty.
ABSTRACT
Many countries rely on standard recipes for accelerating progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). With limited generalizable
empirical evidence, expert confidence and consensus plays a major role in shaping country policy choices. This article presents an ex-
ploratory attempt conducted between April and September 2016 to measure confidence and consensus among a panel of global health
experts in terms of the effectiveness and feasibility of a number of policy options commonly proposed for achieving UHC in low- and
middle-income countries, such as fee exemptions for certain groups of people, ring-fenced domestic health budgets, and public-private
partnerships. To ensure a relative homogeneity of contexts, we focused on French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. We initially used the
Delphi method to arrive at expert consensus, but since no consensus emerged after 2 rounds, we adjusted our approach to a statistical
analysis of the results from our questionnaire by measuring the degree of consensus on each policy option through 100 (signifying total
consensus) minus the size of the interquartile range of the individual scores. Seventeen global health experts from various backgrounds,
but with at least 20 years' experience in the broad region, participated in the 2 rounds of the study. The results provide an initial “map-
ping” of the opinions of a group of experts and suggest interesting lessons. For the 18 policy options proposed, consensus emerged only
on strengthening the supply of quality primary health care services (judged as being effective with a confidence score of 79 and con-
sensus score of 90), and on fee exemptions for the poorest (judged as being fairly easy to implement with a confidence score of 66 and
consensus score of 85). For none of the 18 common policy options was there consensus on both potential effectiveness and feasibility,
with very diverging opinions concerning 5 policy options. The lack of confidence and consensus within the panel seems to reflect the lack
of consistent evidence on the proposed policy options. This suggests that experts' opinions should be framed within strengthened inclu-
sive and “evidence-informed deliberative processes” where the trade-offs along the 3 dimensions of UHC—extending the population
covered against health hazards, expanding the range of services and benefits covered, and reducing out-of-pocket expenditures—can
be discussed in a transparent and contextualized setting.
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, universal health coverage(UHC) has progressively become global health's
number one goal. Progress toward UHC is measured
along 3 dimensions: (1) extending the population cov-
ered by a mechanism of financial protection against
health hazards; (2) expanding the range of services
and benefits covered; and (3) reducing out-of-pocket
expenditure for the services and benefits that are
provided.1–3 However, evidence on the impact of specific
UHC design features is scarce and inconclusive,4 and
it is acknowledged that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to achieving UHC.2,5–8 Therefore, the choice
between the dimension(s) of UHC to be privileged in
the first place and the policy options to implement to
achieve that implies trade-offs and requires a context-
dependent balancing act.6 In practice, however, key
stakeholders and agencies often tend to sidestep the dif-
ficult trade-off decisions by relying on standardized pol-
icy heuristics that may override contextualization and
negotiation. The influence of global health experts may
be very important in this respect.
This article presents exploratory research attempting
to measure global health experts' confidence in, and
possible consensus on, the effectiveness and feasibility
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of a number of policy options commonly proposed
for achieving UHC in low- and middle-income
countries (LMICs). We first present our objectives
and the methodological approach we used, and
then draw general lessons from our results.
METHODS
Our research question emanated from the obser-
vation that many countries rely on standard rec-
ipes for accelerating progress toward UHC. We
aimed to test the following hypothesis: only
those policy options that are judged by a majority
of experts to be both effective (that is, likely to
achieve their intended objective) and feasible
(that is, with a reasonable degree of ease in imple-
mentation) should be implemented in a vast
range of contexts; the others would be used only
in favorable, specific contexts. That is why we
intended to assess the degree of confidence among
a sample of global health experts on the potential
effectiveness and feasibility of a set of common
policy options, to allow us to move toward UHC
in typical African contexts. To do so, we opted for
the Delphi method with the hope that we could
reach some degree of consensus on at least some
policy options that countries could focus on or,
alternatively, avoid.
Based on the World Health Report 2010 on
health systems financing,2 we identified a number
of policy options recommended on the path to
UHC and grouped them along the 3 dimensions
of the UHC “cube.” We selected the most fre-
quently recommended and implemented in
French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa based on
our field experience (Table 1). We then performed
a selective review of the literature on these poli-
cies, in search for systematic evidence when avail-
able and non-systematic evidence otherwise.
We designed a simple questionnaire compris-
ing explanations about the research's purpose
and 2 tables requiring respondents to rate the
potential degree of “effectiveness” and “feasibil-
ity” of the policy options along a 5-point Likert
scale. To limit variability of contexts and ensure
coherence, we focused the study on typical con-
texts of French-speaking sub-Saharan African
countries; and to limit ideological biases, we
selected a number of global health experts work-
ing in various types of organizations (multilateral
organizations, bilateral donors, consulting firms
or freelance consultants, academia, recipient
Ministries of Health) who had experience in this
broad region. Experts were selected on an ad hoc
basis to represent various profiles, but 2 inclusion
criteria were that they had to have (1) at least
20 years' experience in supporting health reforms
in LMICs in general, with substantive experience
in francophone (Western and/or Central) Africa,
and (2) a sufficiently generalist profile in order to
be able to assess the effectiveness and feasibility
of policies relative to the service provision and
the financing dimensions of UHC.
We intended to lead the survey across 2 pan-
els: one composed of 15 experts originating
from Europe and Northern America (representing
8 nationalities) (the Northern panel), and one
composed of 16 experts from Northern, Western,
and Central Africa (representing 11 nationalities)
(the Southern panel). We contacted experts indi-
vidually by email and proposed a discussion of
the questionnaire through the use of Skype if
they were willing to do so. The experts were
blind to each other's scoring and did not interact
during the survey. All participants were informed
about the study's objectives andmethods and con-
sented freely to participate. Anonymity was guar-
anteed until the last step when we shared results
in the aggregate with participating experts. We
planned to pursue the Delphi process until a con-
sensus was reached, and to also compare experts'
responses with the available evidence on policy
options. The 2 rounds of the studywere conducted
between April and September 2016.
Adaptations to the Delphi Method
Unexpectedly, our research attempt confronted
several issues. First, the participation rate was
lower than expected. Of the 31 persons con-
tacted, 23 participated in the first round
(13 from the Northern panel, 10 from the
Southern panel) and 21 participated in the
second round (10 Northern/11 Southern).
However, we had to dismiss 4 respondents
from the second round who had not participated
in the first round, so only 17 experts completed
the 2 survey rounds: 9 from Europe (repres-
enting 5 nationalities) and 8 from Northern,
Western, and Central Africa (representing
8 nationalities). No substantial differences were
observed between the 2 panels, so we merged
them into a single panel in order to analyze the
results. See Table 2 for characteristics of the
17 experts included in our panel.
Second, after the first round of the exercise,
several experts mentioned the difficulty of
granting a score in abstracto for each strategy con-
sidered in an isolated manner. As happens in the
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contextualize, to consider how strategies interact
with each other, and to differentiate between
strategies that may be effective at the micro
level but might not be easily scaled up at the
country level (the “micro-macro” paradox9).
For instance, while there is strong evidence
that community-based health insurance (CBHI)
schemes improve service utilization and protect
members financially by reducing their out-of-
pocket expenditure, and that CBHI improves
resourcemobilization,10 both theory and evidence
suggest that a CBHI model, relying only on
voluntary, small-scale schemes and small pools
with little or no subsidization of poor and vulnera-
ble groups, can play only a very limited role in
helping countries move toward UHC.11
Therefore, per the participants' request, we
converted the initial questionnaire to include
2 sets of 2 questions for the second round. The
first set of questions focused on confidence in the
effectiveness of each policy option. These ques-
tions were broken down into 2 items and thus
scored twice, once for its potential effectiveness
as a stand-alone intervention, and once for its
potential as part of a UHC reform package. The
second set of questions focused on confidence
in feasibility of each policy option. These questions
were scored once for operational and technical
feasibility, and once for political feasibility.
Yet when asked to differentiate between stand-
alone and part-of-package effectiveness, and
between technical and political feasibility, the dif-
ferences in scores were negligible. Consequently,
we merged these when analyzing the results.
Third, during the first round, experts gave a
“moderate” response to the majority of policy
options, thus not clearly positioning themselves
in favor for or against proposed policy options.
To allow formore clear-cut answers, we converted
the Likert scale's results into a nominal scale
from 0 to 100, and asked the second round's
respondents to use the nominal scale to position
themselves in the range between their previous
response and the average response. However, dur-
ing the second round, most policy options kept
scoring in the “moderately effective” range, and
no consensus emerged as we hoped would be
possible.
Therefore, we changed our analytical
approach: since no consensus seemed to
emerge through the use of the Delphi method,
instead, we statistically analyzed the results from
our 17 questionnaires. We measured the degree
of consensus on each policy option through
TABLE 1. Common UHC Policy Options Selected for the Delphi Survey
UHC Dimension Policy Options
Diminish financial barriers to access B1 Fee exemptions for children and pregnant women
B2 Fee exemptions for the poorest
B3 Fee exemptions for priority services (e.g., cesarean deliveries, malaria, HIV)
B4 Mandatory health insurance with subsidization of the poor
B5 Voluntary community-based health insurance
B6 Vouchers for the poor
Improve health care funding F1 Ring-fenced domestic health budgets
F2 Innovative financing for health (e.g., sin tax, bonds)
F3 Pooling and defragmentation of existing financing mechanisms
F4 Reducing inefficiencies and wastage
F5 Performance-based aid funding
F6 Creation of a global UHC fund
Improve the supply and management of
services
S1 Start with a package of essential services for the whole population and progressively
expand the package (“universalist” approach)
S2 Start with a full package of services for some categories of population or geographic areas,
and progressively extend UHC coverage to other types of populations or areas (“sequenced”
approach)
S3 Strengthen the supply of quality primary health care services
S4 Develop public-private partnerships
S5 Results- or performance-based payment of providers
S6 Separate provider and purchaser functions through creation of autonomous health services
or agencies
Abbreviations: B, barriers; F, funding; S, supply; UHC, universal health coverage.
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100minus the size of the interquartile range (IQR)
of the individual scores, with 100 signifying total
consensus.12 This indicates an important meth-
odological limitation of our study, due to a lack of
representativeness of the expert sample. Our
panel was initially designed in a purposive way,
fit for the initial qualitative approach chosen, in
order to represent a wide range of experiences;
however, it is not representative of all global
health experts. Therefore, our quantitative results
must be interpretedwith caution.While providing
an indication of tendencies, they certainly should
not to be thought of as being generalizable. Other
limitations of our study deal with the focus on
French-speaking Africa, which is quite homoge-
neous in some respects—notably the epidemiolog-
ical profile and main features of health systems
and policies—but which also gathers, under the
same umbrella, very different contexts, notably in
terms of wealth and political regimes. Experts'
opinions might also have been biased by their
personal experience, be it positive or negative, in
specific countries.
FINDINGS
Statistical Analysis of Delphi Survey
Responses
Regarding potential effectiveness, only 8 policy
options received a consensus rating of 80% or
above, but 7 of them were in the “moderately
effective” range (confidence scores between
48% and 60%), indicating “soft consensus”
(Table 3). Only the policy option “strengthen
the supply of quality primary health care
services” was consensually judged as being
clearly effective by our panel (confidence score of
79 with a consensus rating of 90).
Regarding feasibility, the degree of consensus
was even lower. Only 2 policy options received a
TABLE 2. Characteristics of the Delphi Study Panel of Experts
Expert















1 Belgium X X X X
2 Belgium X X X
3 Belgium X X
4 France X
5 Germany X X X
6 Germany X X
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consensus rating of 80 or above (performance-
based payment of providers and fee exemption
for the poorest), but one of themwas judgedmod-
erately feasible (with a confidence score of 49), so
that only the policy option “fee exemption for
the poorest” was consensually judged as being
fairly easy to implement by our panel (confidence
score for feasibility of 66, consensus rating of
85). On the other hand, for 5 policy options, the
consensus rating was below 70, indicating very
diverging opinions among the experts.
Review of Key Evidence on Policy Options
To deepen our analysis, we attempted to compare
responses from our panel of experts with the
available evidence (not especially related to
French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa), in order to
assess whether or not each corresponded with the
other. We therefore opted to search for systematic
evidence with regard to each of the 18 proposed
policy options and completed the literature review
with non-systematic evidence when needed.
Regarding the path toward UHC, overall,
the existing literature concludes that the effect of
UHC schemes on access, financial protection,
and health status varies across contexts, UHC
scheme design, and the implementation pro-
cesses. In most countries and regions, a number
of UHC schemes coexist although they demon-
strate heterogeneity in terms of design and organi-
zation. Evidence on the impact of specific UHC
design features on their intended outcomes is
scarce and inconclusive, so that several pathways
may be appropriate.4–7,13,14 Yet, there are indica-
tions that a progressive expansion of a package of
TABLE 3. Average Scores of Delphi Study Participants for Confidence in and Degree of Consensusa on Effectiveness and Feasibility of




Code Policy Option Confidence Consensus Confidence Consensus
B5 Community-based health insurance 40 75 49 60
F5 Performance-based aid funding 43 72 48 72.5
S5 Performance-based payment of providers 48 67.5 49 80
F1 Ring-fenced budgets 48 80 56 73.75
S2 Expansion of population covered 49 80 54 70
F2 Innovative financing 51 80 59 65
S4 Public-private partnerships 54 80 58 72.5
B2 Fee exemption for poorest 55 80 66 85
B6 Vouchers 56 80 63 75
F4 Reduction of inefficiencies 59 75 60 75
B1 Fee exemption for children and pregnant women 60 80 64 77.5
F3 Pooling of schemes 60 75 57 65
S6 Purchaser-provider split 60 75 60 68.75
B3 Fee exemption for specific services 61 75 65 77.5
F6 Global fund for UHC 64 75 67 67.5
S1 Expansion of package of services 64 76.25 68 75
B4 Mandatory health insurance 67 75 68 70
S3 Strengthen supply of quality primary health care 79 90 78 73.75
Abbreviations: B, barriers; F, funding; S, supply; UHC, universal health coverage.

















UHC Policy Options in Sub-Saharan Africa www.ghspjournal.org
Global Health: Science and Practice 2018 5
essential services for the whole population (some-
times called progressive universalism) is prefera-
ble to sequential extension of the share of the
population covered with a full package of serv-
ices.14–17 However, to our knowledge, no system-
atic evidence is available to back this opinion. The
literature is also consensual on the fact that no
country has attained UHC by relying mainly on
voluntary contributions to insurance schemes18,19
and progress toward UHC requires compulsion
and cross-subsidization.6,19,20
Regarding specific policy options, we found
that the lack of confidence and consensus
among our experts, with large inter-expert var-
iability (ranging from 0 to 100 in the case of fee
exemption for the poorest) and many policy
options lying in the “woolly” consensus area,
often matches the lack of consistent evi-
dence on the proposed policy options.
Indeed, the literature is often scanty, inconclu-
sive, and inconsistent, or may challenge the
implementation of the proposed policy options.
This is the case for:
 Fee exemptions: They are shown to entail
many implementation challenges while robust
evidence quantifying their impact remains
scant.21–26
 Ring-fenced domestic budgets for health: The
effectiveness of earmarking taxes or revenue
for health appears to be mixed in terms of
increasing overall funding, improving its
stability, or increasing expenditure for the tar-
get program.5,27–29
 Innovative financing mechanisms: These fall in
various categories, but their potential impact
on efficiency and equity depend on each coun-
try context.30,31
 Mandatory health insurance: A systematic review
of the impact of state-subsidized or social health
insurance schemes found no strong evidence of
any impact on utilization, protection from fi-
nancial risk, or health status.32 Moreover, the
real issue is more about the feasibility of the
strategy, in terms of ensuring enrollment in a
health insurance mechanism, because the will-
ingness to pay for health insurance in LMICs is
low,33 and even subsidized schemes for the
non-poor informal sector face low participation
and retention issues.32
 Performance-based financing: There is no consist-
ent evidence of the effectiveness, efficiency,
and equity of the approach, and there are indi-
cations of possible perverse effects on health
care providers' behavior and weakening of
health systems.34–41
 Public-private partnerships: Despite the scale and
significance of the phenomenon, there is rela-
tively limited conceptualization and in-depth
empirical investigation of such partnerships.
Evidence about their effect on clinical quality,
coverage, equity, and cost-effectiveness is inad-
equate, and other challenges concern scalabil-
ity and scope, indicating the limitations of such
interventions as a basis for universal health
coverage, though interventions can address
focused problems on a restricted scale.42,43
 Purchaser-provider splits:No systematic review or
coherent literature has been found on this mat-
ter, probably due to the extreme diversity in
approaches.
 Performance-linked aid: Its alleged advantages
are flawed theoretically and poorly backed by
empirical research.44–48
On the whole, the quality of the evidence
is low and/or non-systematic. The panel's relative
confidence in mandatory health insurance,
purchaser-provider split, and the creation of a
global fund for UHC contrasts with the lack of
documented evidence for these options.
On the other hand, the literature does provide
evidence that several policy options, with regard
to which our experts had mixed opinions, can
contribute positively to UHC. This is the case
for:
 Community-based health insurance: There is sys-
tematic but weak evidence of a moderate effect
with improved service utilization and financial
protection by reducing out-of-pocket spending;
yet, schemes serve only a limited section of the
population.10,49
 Vouchers: A systematic review of the impact of
vouchers on the use and quality of health care
in developing countries foundmodest evidence
that vouchers effectively target specific popula-
tions, but there is insufficient evidence to deter-
mine whether vouchers deliver health care
efficiently. There is robust evidence that vouch-
ers increase utilization, and modest evidence
that vouchers improve quality,50 in particular
for reproductive health services. Another sys-
tematic review concluded that all identified
evaluations reported some positive findings,
indicating that voucher programs increase the
utilization of reproductive services, improve
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outcomes.51 A related strategy is the use of con-
ditional cash transfers: Overall the evidence sug-
gests that they are effective in increasing the
use of preventive services and sometimes
improving health status.52 A recent systematic
review focusing on sub-Saharan Africa found
that cash transfers can be effective in tackling
structural determinants of health such as finan-
cial poverty, education, household resilience,
child labor, social capital, and social cohesion.
The review further found that cash transfers
modify intermediate determinants such as
nutrition, dietary diversity, child deprivation,
sexual risk behaviors, teen pregnancy, and
early marriage. There is moderate evidence
from the review that cash transfers impact
health and quality-of-life outcomes.53
 Pooling/defragmentation: There is anecdotal evi-
dence of a positive effect, even if experience
suggests that once established, different pools
are politically difficult to integrate or harmo-
nize because integration involves the redistrib-
ution of resources across organized interest
groups.15,17,19,54–56
 Reduction of inefficiencies: There is non-
systematic evidence of a positive effect,57 and
systematic evidence of cost savings and effi-
ciency gains in HIV services in LMICs.58
 Strengthening primary health care: The experts on
our panel were quite confident with regard to
the potential of this policy option, which is
also supported by existing evidence (mainly
non-systematic evidence,5,55,59,60 but also by
systematic evidence in high-income coun-
tries,61,62 and limited systematic evidence in
LMICs).63,64 For instance, a systematic review
found that although a majority of primary care
programs had multiple components—thus
making it difficult to attribute effects to the pri-
mary care component alone given this integra-
tion and the variable quality of the available
research—primary care-focused health initia-
tives in LMICs have improved access to health
care, including among the poor, at reasonably
low cost. There is also evidence that primary
care programs have reduced child mortality
and, in some cases, wealth-based disparities in
mortality.64
DISCUSSION
First, note that since our panel of experts was built
on an ad hoc basis in order to involve a wide range
of experienced, generalist global health experts, it
cannot be characterized as an epistemic commu-
nity, that is “a network of professionals with rec-
ognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue-area.”65 Indeed, if the inclusion criteria
were aimed to guarantee shared knowledge base
about UHC and possibly shared principled beliefs,
their actual heterogeneity in terms of personal and
professional experience—which was desired in
the first place—might have led to different causal
beliefs and possibly different interests or ideologi-
cal values. This might have led to the impossibility
of reaching a consensus through the Delphi
method.
Our study provides an initial “mapping” of the
opinions of a group of experts, which offers inter-
esting lessons. It shows that among a panel of
17 experienced global health experts coming from
varied countries and backgrounds, none
of the 18 common policy options recom-
mended on the path toward UHC received
sufficient consensus regarding both its poten-
tial effectiveness and its feasibility. This lack of
clarity and consensus of opinions regarding UHC
policy options in a relatively homogeneous region
like French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa is itself
an important piece of information. According to
our basic premise, this suggests that we should be
cautious when it comes to implementing these pol-
icy options and that they should be implemented
only in favorable contexts, following a careful anal-
ysis and trade-off process. But this is not the case in
practice, since we observe the concomitant
implementation of many of the proposed options
in most sub-Saharan African countries and
the trend of some donor agencies to “sell” preferred
policy options whatever the context. The most
striking example is probably that of performance-
or results-based financing: This is the one policy
option that received the least consensus among
our panel of experts, which contrasts with its rapid
donor-funded expansion in LMICs. For example,
since its inception in 2007, the Health Results
Innovation Trust Fund managed by the World
Bank has committed $385.6 million for 35 results-
based financing programs in 29 countries, with the
bulk of disbursements taking place in the past
3 years (https://www.rbfhealth.org/projects). This
was done despite the fact that in 2014, the
Independent Evaluation Group of the World
Bank raised a flag by pointing out that the
Bank had promoted results-based financing with
insufficient empirical support on the soundness of
the approach, even proclaiming that “. . . decisions
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were made to scale up regardless of weak, incon-
clusive, or incomplete pilot results.”66
When comparing our results with findings in
the literature, we were struck by the lack of con-
sistent, systematic evidence on the effectiveness
of most policy options. Most worrying, even sup-
posedly systematic evidence may not be entirely
trusted when applied to complex issues. For
instance, Coarasa et al. (2017) examined 2 sys-
tematic reviews of the literature on the quality of
private-sector primary care in LMICs, published
in the same journal within a year and reaching
conflicting conclusions. They found that weak-
nesses in the underlying evidence, rather than
the rigor of the reviews themselves, led to reason-
able disagreements, and therefore called for
high-quality empirical evidence on reforms
aimed at reaching UHC.67 Given the broadness
of the UHC objective and the complexity and diffi-
culty of implementing policy reforms—especially
in low-resource environments such as in French-
speaking sub-Saharan Africa—and given the lack
of robust evidence on possible policy options, it
may therefore be considered very rational for
experts to differ widely in terms of what they
might recommend. This stresses the importance
of contextualized policy advice.
We were also struck by the weak differentia-
tion on the part of the experts between policy
options that are isolated vs. part-of-package
effectiveness on the one hand, and between tech-
nical vs. political feasibility on the other hand (as
explained above, the differences in scores were
negligible, so that we merged these 2 sets of
questions when analyzing the results). We
hypothesize that there is a disjunction between
experts' professional rationality (they are intellec-
tually convinced of the need to contextualize and
to differentiate between effectiveness and feasibil-
ity in complex systems) and a rather heuristic ap-
praisal when asked to judge a strategy. This has
long been recognized,68,69 and shows the difficulty
of formulating objective recommendations in a
complex system. It might also raise doubts as to
how vulnerable to biases knowledgeable and
experienced experts may be when making policy
recommendations.
On this issue, Cairney and Oliver (2017)
identify 2 important dilemmas for scientists
and researchers—that we can extrapolate to
advisers—contributing to an “evidence-policy
gap.” First, effective actors combine evidence
with manipulative emotional appeals to influence
the policy agenda. Second, when adapting
to multilevel policymaking, experts should not
necessarily prioritize “evidence-based” policy-
making above other governance principles such
as the “coproduction” process of policy between
local public bodies, interest groups, and service
users, which may be based primarily on values.
They conclude that successful engagement in
evidence-based policymaking requires pragma-
tism, combining scientific evidence with gover-
nance principles, and persuasion to translate
complex evidence into simple stories. To maxi-
mize the use of scientific evidence with regard to
public health policy, experts should recognize the
tendency of policy makers to base judgements on
their beliefs and shortcuts based on their emotions
and familiarity with information; be prepared to
engage in long-term strategies to be able to influ-
ence policy; and, in both cases, decide how far
they are willing to go to persuade policy makers
to act and secure a hierarchy of evidence under-
pinning policy. These are value-driven and politi-
cal, not just “evidence-based,” choices.70
Finally, we wondered why international
organizations often continue to promote a num-
ber of strategies (“donor fads”), the effectiveness
of which lack consistent evidence. Wane (2004)
establishes both theoretically and empirically that
the quality of aid is endogenous to the incentive
system that prevails in the aid agency (career con-
cerns) and the capacity and accountability of
the recipient country to gauge the quality of
aid. He shows that a mix of factors (recipient gov-
ernments' incentives to accept projects if they
bring personal benefits, a donor agency culture
of “pushing money,” low-capacity and/or low-
accountability recipient governments) leads to re-
cipient governments accepting poorly designed
projects to the detriment of their population.71
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the limitations pointed out above, and
even when limiting the focus to the relatively ho-
mogeneous contexts of French-speaking sub-
Saharan Africa, this exploratory study shows
that global health experts' opinions on pol-
icy options with regard to achieving UHC
diverge a great deal, they are often only
moderately supportive or not in support of
the standard UHC recipes prevalent in
today's global health and development rhet-
oric, and that most policy options are not
backed by systematic and coherent evi-
dence. This conveys implications for the develop-
ment community. Development agencies are
understandably tempted to promote “magic
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bullet” approaches to UHC. Notably due to a cul-
ture of “pushing money” and low-capacity recipi-
ent governments,71 incentives on both the donor
and the recipient side favor simple, easily budg-
eted, single-instrument or isolated solutions,
which can then rapidly proliferate, evenwith little
evidence. This may do more harm than good.20
Expert opinion has a large role to play in justifying
policy choices, but it would be dangerous to take
their opinion for granted—all the more because,
despite a discourse of evidence-based decision
making, development actors may have opinions
based primarily on personal values and may
combine evidence with manipulative emotional
appeals to influence the policy agenda.70 This
makes expert policy advice value-driven and po-
litical, not just “evidence-based.”
Therefore, there is clearly a need for a better
understanding of the interactions between the
multiple stakeholders—including not only the
experts but also the domestic actors—their agen-
das, and their hierarchy of values. While progress
toward UHC has taken various forms around the
globe, a common feature emerging from experi-
ence is that adopting UHC is primarily a political
rather than a technical issue.72,73 Hence, the
need to strengthen inclusive and “evidence-
informed deliberative processes” enabling
stakeholders to discuss the trade-offs along
the 3 dimensions of UHC in a transparent
way, to make the set of values and decision
criteria used more explicit, and to take
decisions in a coherent and contextualized
way.74–77 This might also promote more actively
the respect for domestic political ownership.
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